Competition Law by Heinemann, Andreas
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2014
Competition Law
Heinemann, Andreas
Abstract: Unspecified
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: http://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-102533
Originally published at:
Heinemann, Andreas (2014). Competition Law. In: Bussani, Mauro; et al. European Private Law: A
Handbook: Volume II. Bern: Stämpfli, 261-283.
—-1
—0
—+1
257
Competition Law
Andreas Heinemann
Table of Contents
1. Introduction, 1.1. EU Law and National Law, 1.2. Public and Private En-
forcement, 1.3. Overview — 2. Legal Fundamentals, 2.1. Eu ro pe an  Union 
Law, 2.1.1. Legislation, 2.1.2. Case Law, 2.1.3. Legal doctrine, 2.2. Competi-
tion Law in the Member States, 2.2.1. Starting Point, 2.2.2. Legal Basis of 
Private Claims, 2.2.3. Cessation and Damages, 2.2.4. Burden of Proof, 2.2.5. 
Punitive Damages, 2.2.6. Con) ict of Laws, 2.2.7. Criminal Law Sanc-
tions? — 3. Perspectives to Strengthen Private Enforcementof Competition 
Law, 3.1. Standing, 3.1.1. Direct Purchasers, 3.1.2. Indirect Purchasers and 
the Problem of ‘Passing On’, 3.1.3. Consumers and Consumer Associations, 
3.2. Coexistence of Public and Private Procedures, 3.2.1. Direct E+ ect of 
Competition Law Rules, 3.2.2. Legal Authority of Administrative Deci-
sions, 3.2.3. Coordination of Public and Private Enforcement, 3.3. Leniency 
Policy, 3.3.1. Reduction of Damages in Favour of Leniency Applicants?, 
3.3.2. Protection of Con/ dentiality, 3.3.3. Remaining Tensions — 4. 
 Outlook — Bibliography
1. Introduction
0 e term “competition law” is ambiguous. It encompasses / elds of law 
which form— in most countries— two separate branches. Unfair competition 
law protects the fairness of the competitive pro cess whereas antitrust law 
seeks to secure the existence of competition itself. Unfair competition law is 
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258 COMPETITION LAW
dealt with in another part of this book,1 whereas this chapter addresses an-
titrust law. 0 e term “competition law” will be used  here in the narrow sense 
comprising solely antitrust law. Substantive competition law in Eu rope nor-
mally contains rules for three kinds of behaviour, i.e. restrictive agreements 
(e.g. cartels), the abuse of dominant positions (e.g. exclusionary conduct of a 
monopolist), and, thirdly, the control of mergers and acquisitions.
0 ere are two important features of competition law in Eu rope: Firstly, 
there are in de pen dent sets of competition law on two levels, on the one hand 
the Eu ro pe an competition law in the Treaty on the Functioning of the Eu ro-
pe an  Union (TFEU) and in the related regulations, and on the other hand the 
national competition laws of the Member States. Secondly, the enforcement 
of competition law in Eu rope has almost entirely been a matter of adminis-
trative law while private enforcement of antitrust law is (contrary to the situ-
ation in the USA) of less signi/ cance. Both traits are about to change.
1.1. EU Law and National Law
As regards the coexistence of EU and national competition law, it is true 
that there have not been Eu ro pe an directives on the harmonization of na-
tional antitrust law up to today. For transactions which a+ ect only domestic 
markets or third countries (not being members of the EU/EEA), the national 
legislator is free in shaping competition law. Since Eu ro pe an competition 
law is not applicable in these cases, the Member States could theoretically 
adopt or maintain completely di+ erent rules. For cross- border transactions 
between EU Member States, the primacy of EU law (and Art. 3 (2) of the Eu-
ro pe an Cartel Regulation 1/2003) merely provides that national competition 
law may not be applied with a result that contradicts Eu ro pe an competition 
law. However, there is a strong actual in) uence of EU law on national com-
petition law. Di+ erent rules for cross- border and internal transactions would 
lead to an unequal treatment, especially with regard to large / rms on the 
one hand and small and medium enterprises on the other hand. Such di+ er-
ences are hardly communicable. 0 erefore there is a heavy pressure on the 
Member States to bring their national competition law into line with Eu ro-
pe an competition law. Some legal orders even explicitly provide that na-
tional competition law has to be interpreted in accordance with Eu ro pe an 
competition law (Italy, UK). As a result, national competition law codes 
converge to EU competition law.
1.  See 0 omas M.J. Möllers (in this volume).
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1.2. Public and Private Enforcement
Public Enforcement is the most visible form of competition law enforce-
ment. Competition authorities sometimes carry out dawn raids and impose 
/ nes. Private enforcement is less spectacular: 0 e most frequent use of compe-
tition law in private actions is made on the defence side by invoking the nullity 
of a contract as the result of a competition law violation. Less developed is the 
active use of competition law by bringing a cease and desist claim or an action 
for damages.
0 e view is widely accepted that private remedies should be strengthened 
in Eu rope.2 0 is opinion is not only shared by the vast majority in the schol-
arly debate, but has been endorsed by the Eu ro pe an institutions. In its Cour-
age, Manfredi and P  eiderer judgments, the Eu ro pe an Court of Justice has 
underlined the importance of private enforcement.3 0 e Eu ro pe an legislator 
has justi/ ed Regulation 1/2003 (bringing about a fundamental reform of com-
petition law enforcement) in part with the aim of strengthening the decentral-
ised application of Eu ro pe an competition law by private remedies.4 Finally, in 
2008, the Eu ro pe an Commission has published a White Paper on Damages 
Actions for Breach of the Eu ro pe an Competition Rules which explores the 
main obstacles to private damages claims and proposes di+ erent options in 
favour of a stronger role of private remedies.5 0 e Eu ro pe an Commission has 
announced legislatives mea sures in order to stimulate private enforcement.6
2.  For an overview see Behrens/Hartmann- Rüppel/Herrlinger (eds.), Schadensersatz-
klagen gegen Kartellmitglieder, Baden- Baden 2010; Ehlermann/Atanasiu (eds.), Eu ro pe an 
Competition Law Annual 2001: E+ ective Private Enforcement of EC Antitrust, Oxford 
2003; Heinemann, Private Enforcement in Eu rope, in Zäch, Heinemann, Kellerhals 
(eds.), 0 e Development of Competition Law: Global Perspectives, Cheltenham 2010, 
300– 318; Möschel/Bien (eds.), Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung durch private Schadenersatz-
klagen?, Cheltenham 2010. For an opposing view see Wils, Should Private Antitrust En-
forcement be Encouraged in Eu rope?, World Competition 473 (2003).
3.  ECJ, 20.9.2001, C-453/99, Courage and Crehan [2001] ECR I-6297; ECJ, 13.7.2006, 
Joined Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04, Manfredi [2006] ECR I-6619; ECJ, 14.6.2011, 
C-360/09, P) eiderer [2011], 48(5) CMLR 219.
4.  Monti, Private Litigation as a Key Complement to Public Enforcement of Competi-
tion Rules (2004), 17.9.2004, SPEECH/04/403, at europa.eu/rapid/searchAction.do.
5.  Eu ro pe an Commission, White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC An-
titrust Rules, 2 April 2008, COM(2008) 165 / nal. See also Eu ro pe an Commission, Green 
Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, 19.12.2005, COM(2005) 
672 / nal. Cf. Bulst, Of Arms and Armor— 0 e Eu ro pe an Commission’s White Paper on 
Damages Actions for Breach of EC Antitrust Law, 2 Bucerius L. J. 81 f. (2008).
6.  See Bulst, Schadensersatz wegen Kartellrechtsverletzungen, Baden- Baden 2006, 
117 f.
138-54868_ch08_1P.indd   259 6/5/13   2:22 AM
-1—
0—
+1—
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1.3. Overview
In this chapter, an overview on private competition law enforcement in 
Eu rope shall be given.7 We will see that— in the absence of explicit EU law 
rules— it is still up to national law to provide private parties with e+ ective 
remedies. 0 is is equally true for the private enforcement of national and Eu-
ro pe an competition law. 0 e reasons for the underdevelopment of private 
competition law remedies will be explored thus uncovering the major issues 
at stake in Eu ro pe an private competition law.8
2. Legal Fundamentals
2.1. Eu ro pe an  Union Law
2.1.1. Legislation
EU primary law hardly contains private law in the proper sense. Competition 
law is an exception. Art. 101 (2) TFEU declares agreements or decisions prohib-
ited by Art. 101 TFEU to be automatically void. However, the treaty as well as 
secondary legislation rest silent about other private law consequences of a viola-
tion of Eu ro pe an competition law. 0 erefore, it is up to the national law of the 
Member States to provide for private remedies not only for the violation of na-
tional competition law, but also for breaches of the Eu ro pe an competition rules.
One of the reasons underlying the modernization regulation 1/2003 is to 
spur the decentralized application of competition law before the national 
courts. As from 1 may 2004, Art. 101 (3) TFEU has become directly applica-
ble. 0 e noti/ cation and authorization system being valid before has been 
transformed into a system of legal exceptions. In this context, Art. 2 Regula-
tion 1/2003 allocates the burden of proof: Authorities and private plainti+ s 
have to prove the infringement of Art. 101 (1) or 102 TFEU whereas the enter-
prise invoking Art. 101 (3) TFEU has to prove the prerequisites of this rule. It 
is not clear, though, whether the new cartel regulation contributes to the 
strengthening of private remedies.9 In future, the defendant can directly 
7.  0 e overview is based on Heinemann, Part II– Remedies in Antitrust Law, in 
Möllers/Heinemann (eds.), 0 e Enforcement of Competition Law in Eu rope, Cambridge 
2007, 387– 658, presenting and analysing country reports of 15 EU Member States.
8.  For an overview on the pitfalls of private enforcement see Zäch/Heizmann, Durch-
setzung des Wettbewerbsrechts durch Private, Poznan 2005.
9.  Sceptical Wils, 0 e Modernization of the Enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 EC: A 
Legal and Economic Analysis of the Commission’s Proposal for a New Council Regula-
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 invoke Art. 101 (3) TFEU. Even if he has to prove the prerequisites of this 
exception, this increases the risk for the plainti+ .10
2.1.2. Case Law
0 e Eu ro pe an Court of Justice has limited the freedom of the Member 
States to shape private remedies for competition law violations. In its Courage- 
decision—con/ rmed by the Manfredi judgment11— the court has established 
the principle of equivalence. Private law actions based on the violation of Eu-
ro pe an competition law must not stay behind what would be awarded due to 
a violation of national competition law.  Here, it is national law having an in-
) uence on Eu ro pe an law in so far as the consequences of a violation of EU law 
are partly guided by national law.
0 e court has added the principle of e" ectiveness to the principle of equiv-
alence according to which national law must not render practically impossi-
ble or excessively di  cult the exercise of rights conferred by EU law.12 For 
example, the En glish courts had to change their practice according to which 
actions for damages based on a competition law violation are excluded from 
the start for a party which participated itself in the restrictive agreement. 
Damages can only be refused to participants who carry ‘signi/ cant responsi-
bility’ for the violation of competition law.
2.1.3. Legal Doctrine
In legal doctrine, the Courage- decision has led to a controversy on the na-
ture of private remedies in the case of a violation of Eu ro pe an competition 
law. Some authors draw a parallel to the liability of member states according 
to the principles of the Francovich- case13 and qualify the action for damages 
resulting from the violation of Eu ro pe an competition law as a claim directly 
deriving from EU law.14 On the other hand, the predominant opinion holds 
tion Replacing Regulation No.17, in Hawk (ed.), Fordham Corporate Law Institute, New 
York 2001, note 110.
10.  Under previous law, the defendant normally could not invoke the e  ciency 
 defence. When the restrictive agreement had not been noti/ ed to the Commission, the 
application of Art. 101 (3) TFEU was excluded from the outset.
11.  See supra note 3.
12.  ECJ, Courage, supra note 3, n. 29, con/ rmed by ECJ, Manfredi, supra note 3,n. 62.
13.  ECJ, 19.11.1991, Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, Francovich/Italy, [1991] ECR 
I-5357.
14.  See e.g. Jones, Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law in the EU, UK and USA, 
Oxford 1999, 152; Keßler, Private Enforcement— Zur deliktsrechtlichen Aktualisierung 
des deutschen und europäischen Kartellrechts im Lichte des Verbraucherschutzes, WRP 
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the traditional view that such claims are rooted in national law which is 
simply modi/ ed by EU law via the principle of e+ ectiveness.15 No matter 
which opinion one shares: Up until now the subject of private remedies has 
not yet been regulated in Eu ro pe an secondary law. Uncertainties in the ap-
plication of private remedies are the consequence. In our outlook, this prob-
lem will have to be dealt with (see below part 3).
2.2. Competition Law in the Member States
2.2.1. Starting Point
All 27 EU Member States have competition law rules which— in substan-
tive law— have a structure similar to Eu ro pe an competition law: 0 ere are 
rules on the three kinds of behaviour mentioned above. In addition, in some 
Member States, stricter rules on unilateral behaviour exist, e.g. the exploita-
tion of a state of economic dependence (France, Germany).16 In every Mem-
ber State, there are one or several competition authorities watching over the 
respect of competition law rules and endowed with the competence to in-
struct and to sanction anti- competitive behaviour. Besides this, everywhere 
the possibility of private enforcement exists, at least in theory. However, all 
over Eu rope, public enforcement of competition law by state authorities clearly 
prevails. 0 is is partly due to the absence of incentives in view of the uncer-
tainty of private law suits regarding legal costs awards and the distribution of 
the burden of proof. Another reason is the strong position of administrative 
1061, n. 2.3.1 (2006); Komninos, New Prospects for Private Enforcement of EC Competi-
tion Law: Courage v. Crehan and the Community Right to Damages, 39 Common Mar-
ket L. Rev. 465 + . (2002); Mäsch, Private Ansprüche bei Verstößen gegen das europäische 
Kartellverbot—“Courage” und die Folgen, EuR 825, 841 f. (2003). In this sense already the 
Advocate General van Gerven, in ECJ, Case C-128/92, Banks/British Coal Corporation, 
[1994] ECR I-1209, di+ ering van Gerven, Of Rights, Remedies and Procedure, 37 Com-
mon Market L. Rev. 501, 503 (2000).
15.  Alexander, Schadensersatz und Abschöpfung im Lauterkeits- und Kartellrecht, 
Tübingen 2010, 327; Lettl, Der Schadensersatzanspruch gemäß § 823 Abs. 2 BGB i.V. mit 
Art. 81 EG, 167 ZHR 473, 476 (2003); Weyer, Schadensersatzansprüche gegen Private 
kra  Gemeinscha srecht, 13 ZEuP 318, 325 f. (2003); Wurmnest, Das Gemeinscha sde-
liktsrecht in der aktuellen Rechtsprechung der Gemeinscha sgerichte, 1 GPR 129, 135 
(2003/04). Equally in this sense Eu ro pe an Commission, Notice on the co- operation be-
tween the Commission and the courts of the EU Member States in the application of 
Articles 81 and 82 EC, OJ 2004 C 101/54, n. 10.
16.  Pursuant to Art. 3 (2) s. 2 Regulation 1/2003, Member States are not precluded 
from adopting and applying on their territory stricter national laws which prohibit or 
sanction unilateral conduct engaged in by enterprises.
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enforcement. 0 e administrative proceeding is not only without cost to the 
applicant, but in addition gives access to a mechanism for the clari/ cation of 
evidence and the imposition of sanctions.
On the other hand, there are also strong arguments in favour of civil pro-
ceedings: Injunctive relief in par tic u lar civil courts may be faster and more 
e  cient. Moreover, administrative law is characterised by the ‘opportunity 
principle’: the applicant does not know in advance whether the antitrust au-
thority will decide to take action. Consequently, it is o en advisable (from the 
claimant’s perspective) to adopt a dual approach. 0 e results of administra-
tive proceedings are / rst to be awaited; than civil law proceedings are pur-
sued on that basis (so- called follow- on actions).
2.2.2. Legal Basis of Private Claims
Although everywhere private remedies for competition law violations 
 exist, the legal basis for such remedies varies considerably. While, in some 
countries, there are special antitrust claims, in other countries resort is had 
to general civil law. Special antitrust claims exist for example in Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Spain, and Sweden, while in Austria, Denmark, France, the 
Netherlands, and the UK general tort law (in conjunction with competition 
law interdictions) is relied upon. It may also be the case that unfair competi-
tion law is extended to cover antitrust infringements. 0 ese di+ erences are of 
a merely constructive nature and have no apparent in) uence on the result. 
Also in those countries which have their own competition law basis for 
claims, general civil law is relied upon to clarify matters which have not 
found a special rule. Nevertheless, it would seem advisable to introduce spe-
ci/ c competition law claims in all national legislations. 0 is serves on the one 
hand the interest of clarity, since an explicit legal basis emphasizes that such 
private law claims do exist. On the other hand, it will enable the legislator to 
provide for certain rules which apply speci/ cally to competition law, thus 
removing problems which may arise in the / eld of private enforcement of 
competition law only.
2.2.3. Cessation and Damages
If all the requirements for a private law claim are ful/ lled, the aggrieved 
party can demand cessation by the violator. If the infringer is additionally at 
fault then a claim for damages will result. 0 e typical requirements for a dam-
age claim are a) the competition law violation, b) the loss, c) causation of the 
loss by the legal infringement, as well as d) fault. National legislations in most 
Eu ro pe an countries assume that the loss to be recovered includes the actual 
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losses (damnum emergens) as well as loss of pro/ t (lucrum cessans).17 0 us, at 
least in theory, the legal prerequisites exist to ensure private enforcement of 
competition law. However, the obstacles are not so much in theory, but in 
practice, especially as regards the burden of proof.
Before raising this subject, another point has to be explored which— in 
some countries— severely a+ ects the availability of damages. O en, in the 
case of restrictive agreements, the injured party has itself participated in 
the anticompetitive behaviour. 0 is is for example the case in vertical 
agreements, where restrictive clauses on exclusivity or prices are agreed 
upon. Does the involvement of the claimant a+ ect his damage claim? Based 
on principles like ex dolo malo non oritur actio or nemo auditur propriam 
turpitudinem allegans some countries regard the claimant’s participation as 
highly signi/ cant, and the complete exclusion of compensatory claims is 
considered possible (Greece, Sweden, UK). In other countries the own par-
ticipation is considered under the aspect of contributory liability and may 
lead to a reduction or even complete exclusion of the compensatory claim. 
On the other hand, if the claimant’s responsibility is set low, the reduction 
of the compensatory claim may not apply at all (Germany, Hungary, Po-
land, Portugal).
0 e consequences of the claimant’s involvement is a prominent example 
for the in) uence of EU law on national tort law: According to the— already 
mentioned—Courage- decision of the ECJ, compensatory claims for the viola-
tion of the cartel prohibition are not excluded simply because the claimant is 
party to the distorting agreement. On the other hand, compensatory claims 
may be excluded if the claimant “bears signi/ cant responsibility for the dis-
tortion of competition.”18 National law has to abide by this decision, and 
probably will do so also for purely domestic cases.
2.2.4. Burden of Proof
0 e limited status of private claims in Eu rope is due among other things to 
the di  culty of producing evidence for the four elements mentioned above. 
All these preconditions have as a rule to be established by the claimant. Only 
in Ireland and the UK are there comprehensive duties of discovery. With re-
gard to the evidence question there is therefore a divide between common 
17.  As regards violations of Eu ro pe an competition law, this follows from the principle 
of e+ ectiveness, see ECJ, Manfredi, supra note 3, n. 95.
18.  See ECJ, Courage, supra note 3, n. 31.
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law and civil law countries.19 It would certainly be too simplistic to say that in 
common law countries the claimant can / le a claim in the hope that the evi-
dence will be revealed by the respondent. But there is at least a certain allevia-
tion of the burden of proof in these countries.20 In civil law countries, by 
contrast, the claimant must undertake intensive preparation of his case. He 
has to research all the evidence himself. If he realises that he will not be able to 
produce comprehensive evidence, he is advised not to persist with the claim. 
As the evidentiary di  culties are o en unavoidable and result in an unjusti-
/ ed advantaging of the respondent, special consideration should be given to 
better access to evidence and to the easing of the burden of proof according to 
the general rules of evidence. Most Eu ro pe an countries provide for ) exibility 
regarding the calculation of quantum. If through no responsibility of the ag-
grieved party the precise calculation presents di  culties, then the courts of-
ten have the discretion to estimate the extent of losses incurred.21 In all 
countries only losses actually incurred can be claimed, but not the pro/ ts 
gained by the infringer. In certain countries, however, infringer pro/ ts can 
be cited as the starting point for the calculation of losses (Germany since 
2005, Sweden).
2.2.5. Punitive Damages
Another di+ erence between common law and civil law countries is the 
question of punitive damages. With the exception of Ireland and the UK, no 
punitive damages are awarded. Whether punitive damages should be intro-
duced generally in Eu rope for competition law infringements is highly con-
troversial. 0 e predominant view in Eu rope rejects punitive damages, as they 
cannot be reconciled with the compensatory principles of damages claims. 
0 e supporters of punitive damages on the other hand point to the possibility 
19.  Woods/Sinclair/Ashton, Private Enforcement of Community Competition Law: 
Modernisation and the Road Ahead, 10(2) Competition Policy Newsletter 31, 34 (2004).
20.  0 erefore there is a strong incentive to claim before British courts. See (particularly 
with regard to the vitamin cartel) Bulst, 0 e Provimi Decision of the High Court: Begin-
nings of Private Antitrust Litigation in Eu rope, 4 EBOR 623 (2003); Id., Internationale 
Zuständigkeit, anwendbares Recht und Schadensberechnung im Kartelldeliktsrecht, 14 
EWS 403, 404 (2004): this incentive is strengthened by the possibilities for exemplary 
damages and group actions under En glish law.
21.  Moreover, the Eu ro pe an Commission is elaborating a paper supposed to guide 
national courts when it comes to determining damages, see Eu ro pe an Commission, 
Dra  Guidance Paper: Quantifying Harm in Actions for Damages Based on Breaches of 
Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Eu ro pe an  Union, Brussels 2011.
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of treble damages in the USA and thereby strengthened incentives to make 
use of the possibility of private enforcement. As a compromise against the 
background of Eu ro pe an circumstances, the introduction of double damages 
has been suggested.22 However, the topic of punitive damages is no longer 
part of the Eu ro pe an reform proposals.
2.2.6. Con! ict of Laws
If a restrictive behaviour has cross- border e+ ects, the question arises of 
which national (or supranational) competition law regime is to be applied.23 
As regards public enforcement, it is clear from the outset that a competition 
authority can only apply its own national (or supranational) competition law. 
In private law however, it is recognised world- wide, even if not universally 
practised, that the court of a country can be called upon to apply foreign law. 
Con) ict of law rules determine which legal regime is applicable in the indi-
vidual case. In practice however there are almost no court decisions in which 
a court has applied foreign antitrust law.24 0 is is not only due to the scarcity 
of private enforcement in Eu rope, but also to the lack of clear legal rules on 
this question. For a long time, Switzerland has been the only country having 
adopted a special con) ict of law rule in the / eld of antitrust law: “Claims 
based on a restraint of competition are governed by the law of the state in 
whose market the restraint has direct e+ ects on the injured party.”25 0 us, 
competition law of the lex fori may be applied only to the extent that e+ ects 
are perceived domestically. For e+ ects in other countries, the respective com-
petition rules of these countries apply. 0 e EU has adopted a similar rule in 
Art. 6 (3) of the Rome II Regulation:26 “0 e law applicable to a non- contractual 
22.  Monopolkommission (Germany), Das allgemeine Wettbewerbsrecht in der 7. 
GWB- Novelle, Sondergutachten, 2004, at  www .monopolkommission .de /sg _41 /text _s41 
.pdf, n. 75, 126, 131.
23.  A further problem concerns international procedural law, i.e. which country’s 
courts have jurisdiction in an international case. For these international questions, cf. 
Basedow/Francq/Idot (eds.), International Antitrust Litigation, Oxford- Portland 2012; 
Bulst, supra note 20, 403; Mäsch, Vitamine für Kartellopfer— Forum shopping im eu-
ropäischen Kartelldeliktsrecht, IPRax 509 (2005).
24.  Basedow, Who Will Protect Competition in Eu rope? From Central Enforcement 
to Authority Networks and Private Litigation, 2 EBOR 443, 461 (2001); Schwartz/Base-
dow, Restrictions on Competition, in International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, 
vol. III, Tübingen et al. 1995, chp. 35, sec. 103, 109, 112.
25.  Art. 137 of the Swiss Law on Private International Law.
26.  Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the Eu ro pe an Parliament and of the Council on 
the law applicable to non- contractual obligations (Rome II) of 11 July 2007, OJ L 199/40. See 
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obligation arising out of a restriction of competition shall be the law of the 
country where the market is, or is likely to be, a+ ected.” However, under cer-
tain conditions, the plainti+  has the possibility to base his claim entirely on 
the lex fori.
2.2.7. Criminal Law Sanctions?
In 2002, Ireland introduced comprehensive penal law sanctions (/ nes and 
custodial sentences) for competition law infringements, as did the UK in the 
Enterprise Act 2002 concerning the ‘dishonest’ participation of directors and 
employees in certain hard- core cartels. France has similar rules. In this re-
spect, the three countries provide an exception in Eu rope: Only in individual 
cases and under narrowly speci/ ed circumstances are there criminal law 
rules in the EU Member States. 0 ere is even a contrary trend to be recog-
nised. Countries which originally had criminal antitrust rules abolished 
them in connection with their accession to the EU (Finland, Sweden). How-
ever an intensi/ cation of the discussion is apparent under the in) uence of 
Anglo- American legal development, which gives high importance to crimi-
nal law sanctions.27 A parallel to private law sanctions may be seen in that 
both criminal law and private law occupy a subordinate position in anti-
trust law. While private law could already be further developed within the 
existing law, it would require legislative mea sures for the introduction or 
strengthening of criminal law sanctions. 0 ere is no Europe- wide consen-
sus in this question. As the competence for criminal law lies with the Mem-
ber States, countries with extensive competition law experience could lead 
the way.
Basedow, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in the Private Enforcement of EC Competition 
Law, in Basedow (ed.), Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law, Alphen aan den Rijn 
2007, 229 f.; Mankowski, Das neue Internationale Kartellrecht des Art. 6 Abs. 3 der Rom 
II- Verordnung, RIW 177 (2008).
27.  See Dannecker/Jansen (eds.), Competition Law Sanctioning in the Eu ro pe an 
 Union - 0 e EU- Law In) uence on the National Law System of Sanctions in the Eu ro pe an 
Area, 0 e Hague et al. 2004; Heinemann, Kriminalrechtliche Individualsanktionen im 
Kartellrecht?, in Kunz/Herren/Cottier/Matteotti (eds.), Wirtscha srecht in 0 eorie und 
Praxis— Festschri  für Roland von Büren, Basel 2009, 595f.; Wils, Is Criminalisation of 
EU Competition Law the Answer?, in Zäch/Heinemann/Kellerhals (eds.), supra note 2, 
250 f.
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3.  Perspectives to Strengthen Private 
Enforcement of Competition Law
3.1. Standing
0 e risk of private litigation increases if there are no precise rules on 
standing, i.e. on the question who can take legal action. 0 e question of 
standing is far from clear in Eu rope. Enterprises generally have standing if 
they are directly a+ ected by a competition law infringement as competitors 
or direct contractual partners, e.g. as suppliers or purchasers. In other con-
stellations there may be restrictions. For example the legal position is not 
clear of those businesses which are neither competitors nor contractual part-
ners but indirect purchasers. Equally diverse is the question of standing of 
consumers or of consumer associations. In order to enhance private enforce-
ment, it is essential to specify the preconditions for bringing an action.
3.1.1. Direct Purchasers
All over Eu rope, direct purchasers have standing for an own claim if they 
are adversely a+ ected by a restrictive agreement on the preceding market 
level. 0 ey may apply for an injunction or demand damages.28
3.1.2. Indirect Purchasers and the Problem of ‘Passing On’
Less clear is the situation of indirect purchasers. 0 e legal situation varies 
considerably between the Member States. In some countries indirect pur-
chasers are denied standing as a matter of principle regardless of whether 
they be enterprises or consumers.29 Other states regard indirect purchaser 
claims as possible provided an enterprise is concerned. Only a minority of 
countries extend standing to indirect purchasers within their broadest de/ -
nition, that is including consumers.30
28.  An exception was Germany where, according to the view of the majority of 
courts, claims  were only possible if the restriction of competition was directly aimed at 
the purchaser. 0 is rule excluded private claims in case of industry- wide cartels not di-
rected against a par tic u lar enterprise. As it made not much sense to exempt the most 
blatant cartels from civil liability, the law was changed in 2005.
29.  0 is corresponds to the indirect purchaser rule of US- American law, see US 
Supreme Court, Illinois Brick Co. v Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
30.  In this sense see the legislative changes in Germany since 1 July 2005, and Sweden 
since 1 August 2005. 0 ese reforms may be interpreted as a tendency to strengthen the 
rights of consumers in competition law.
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0 e question of standing for indirect purchasers is closely linked to the 
problem of “passing on”. Can the respondent defend himself against a com-
petition claim on the grounds that the claimant has shi ed the overcharge 
(the increase in price due to the cartel agreement) onto the next market level? 
If standing to indirect purchasers is denied, the passing on defence should 
not be accepted because otherwise nobody could claim the overcharge.31 0 e 
same is true vice versa: If the passing on defence is accepted, the indirect pur-
chasers should have standing because otherwise the infringer would not be 
liable.32
0 e legal situation in Eu rope is unclear in this respect, and there are (with 
the exception of the new competition law in Germany33) no special rules on 
the subject. 0 e application of general considerations of compensation law 
leads rather to a recognition of the passing on defence, that is, awarding the 
direct purchaser only the actual and / nal loss incurred. If this viewpoint is 
shared there is a compelling necessity to also admit indirect purchaser claims. 
Otherwise there would be serious gaps in the protection o+ ered by private 
enforcement.
Even if the opposing standpoint is taken, with the tendency to exclude the 
passing on defence, it should not be concluded from this that the indirect 
purchaser has no claim. 0 is would seriously jeopardize the practical e+ ec-
tiveness of private enforcement. Frequently, the direct purchaser has no in-
centive to / le a claim against the cartel members, e.g. for the very reason that 
31.  Cf. US- American law: In Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp, 392 
U.S. 481 (1968), the US Supreme Court had excluded the passing on defence. 0 is led to 
the indirect purchaser rule in Illinois Brick, supra note 29. Otherwise, the same damage 
could have been demanded twice.
32.  0 is is the situation in Switzerland: the passing on defence is accepted, but stand-
ing to consumers is denied so that a liability gap occurs, see A. Heinemann, Consomma-
tion et concurrence— Améliorer le statut juridique des consommateurs et de leurs 
associations en droit des cartels, in Ojha/Vulliemin (eds.), Le droit de la consommation 
dans son contexte économique, Lausanne 2009, 45, 58– 59. A legislative proposal, cur-
rently discussed, aims at / lling this gap.
33.  § 33 (3) s. 2 of the German Act Against Restraints of Competition (GWB) 2005 
provides: “If a good or ser vice is purchased at an excessive price, a damage shall not be 
excluded on account of the resale of the good or ser vice.” 0 e preparatory works show, 
that this text does not categorically exclude the passing- on defence. It simply clari/ es that 
even in the case of passing- on damage occurs initially. 0 e question if the damages might 
be compensated by the bene/ ts received was le  over to the courts. 0 e German Federal 
Court of Justice has decided that the passing- on defence is admitted, and that the compe-
tition law infringer bears the burden of proof that damages  were compensated through 
the resale, see Bundesgerichtshof, 28.6.2011, ORWI, NJW (2012) 928.
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he was able to shi  the loss onto the next commercial level or because he does 
not wish to harm the business relationship to the supplier. If the direct pur-
chaser waives its own legal action and if indirect purchaser claims are ex-
cluded a priori, private enforcement would be brought to a complete standstill.34 
In our view, it should follow from general principles of compensatory law, 
that if several claimants are possible, then recovery must be apportioned. 
Otherwise there would be a multiplied burden on the violator, which would 
be tantamount to punitive damages.
Finally, it should be added that, in the Courage- decision, the ECJ has 
stated that “the full e+ ectiveness of art. 85 of the Treaty [today: Art. 101 
TFEU], and in par tic u lar, the practical e+ ect of the prohibition laid down in 
art. 85(1) would be put at risk if it  were not open to any individual to claim 
damages for loss caused to him by a contract or conduct liable to restrict or 
distort competition.”35 0 is ruling is not compatible with denying standing 
to indirect purchasers.
3.1.3. Consumers and Consumer Associations
In some countries, only enterprises, but not consumers, will be seen as 
falling within the protection of competition law. 0 e fear is wide- spread that 
otherwise the circle of potential claimants would become immeasurably 
wide. 0 e result is paradoxical: Although competition is intended to bring 
about the best results for the consumer in the interest of consumer sover-
eignty, these very consumers are denied standing. 0 is path should not be 
followed. Besides the arguments already mentioned, the consumer, as the 
typical ultimate user, cannot pass on his losses to a subsequent market level.
However, the incentives for individuals to pursue such claims are small. 
Although the macroeconomic harm of cartel arrangements is im mense, the 
resulting harm to the ultimate consumer can be so fragmented that the pur-
suit of an in de pen dent claim is not worthwhile. 0 erefore, standing should 
be granted to consumer associations, not only for cessation claims, but also 
for compensatory claims. 0 e consumer associations should (with the excep-
tion of a costs award) not be allowed to retain the moneys for themselves and 
should also not have to surrender it to the state, but rather it should directly 
bene/ t the consumer. 0 is could be done by means of a registration system 
in which consumers have to establish the degree to which they have been 
34.  See on this subject the detailed study of Bulst, supra note 6.
35.  See ECJ, Courage, supra note 3, n. 26 (author’s emphasis), con/ rmed by ECJ, 
Manfredi, supra note 3, n. 60; ECJ, P) eiderer, supra note 3, n. 28.
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a+ ected. In order to limit administrative expenses ) at- rate amounts should 
be possible.
Moreover, consumer associations should also have standing in adminis-
trative proceedings. In this way the problem of ‘buying up’ of procedural 
rights could be resolved. 0 is is in the / rst place signi/ cant in connection 
with merger control. In many jurisdictions, the approval of mergers can be 
challenged by other enterprises, with the consequence that considerable de-
lays can ensue. 0 erefore it happens in practice that the would- be merging 
parties settle with the claimants: in return for payment or the provision of 
other bene/ ts the claimants withdraw their legal remedies so that the merger 
can be implemented. Such a practice is problematic because the legality of the 
merger is not adjudicated on competition- related grounds but rather by an 
extra- judicial settlement between enterprises frequently of the same sector. If 
the consumer associations had standing in their own right, the basis for such 
a settlement between the interested enterprises would be withdrawn: even if 
the competitors withdrew their claims the association could still maintain its 
objection.
3.2. Coexistence of Public and Private Procedures
As in most EU Member States the possibility of private enforcement ex-
ists, it may well be the case that a civil proceeding runs parallel to adminis-
trative proceedings. 0 e co- existence of both enforcement forms is not 
always peaceful.36
3.2.1. Direct E" ect of Competition Law Rules
0 e history of competition law may be characterized by the development 
from the misuse principle to the interdiction principle: competition rules fol-
lowing the interdiction principle are directly applicable whereas rules follow-
ing the misuse principle presuppose imperatively a prior decision of the 
competition authority. 0 is has an impact on private litigation: In legislations 
following the misuse principle the injured party has to await the authority’s 
decision before going to a civil court.37
36.  A. Heinemann, Interferenzen zwischen ö+ entlichem Recht und Privatrecht in der 
Wettbewerbspolitik, in Epiney/Haag/Heinemann (eds.), Challenging Boundaries— 
Essays in Honor of Roland Bieber, Baden- Baden 2007.
37.  In Switzerland, the situation is more complicated since a notion of “misuse princi-
ple” is prevalent which deviates from the international understanding. For details see A. 
Heinemann, Konzeptionelle Grundlagen des Schweizer und EG- Kartellrechts im  Vergleich, 
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Today, the opinion is wide- spread that an e+ ective competition law must 
provide for rules following the interdiction principle— at least for the most 
important antitrust violations. Consequently, the victims may go immedi-
ately to court without waiting for activities of an authority.
0 is has not always been universally recognised. In Spain, until a funda-
mental reform in 2007, administrative proceedings took priority. 0 e injured 
party had / rst to apply to the administrative authority. Only a er a success-
ful administrative proceeding he could seek redress through a claim in the 
civil courts. Slightly di+ erent is the situation in Sweden: 0 ere, a private 
claim before the ‘market court’ is only admissible if the administrative au-
thority has refrained from a claim on its own behalf. Private claims before the 
general civil courts are possible at any time. But to avoid a stay of proceedings, 
it is advisable for plainti+ s to present a certi/ cate by the administrative au-
thority con/ rming that there are no plans for o  cial intervention. 0 e plain-
ti+  will therefore generally turn to the antitrust authority as a matter of 
course because he needs such a certi/ cate. 0 e situation is di+ erent again in 
Greece where the administrative antitrust proceeding has priority as a matter 
of fundamental principle. A cessation claim can therefore not be pursued 
before a civil court. 0 e position is di+ erent for a compensatory claim, in that 
 here the antitrust authority has no competence and claims for damages are 
possible before the civil courts.
It seems evident that the goal of strengthening private enforcement can 
only be achieved if stand- alone proceedings are possible. 0 e relationship 
between public and private enforcement should therefore be based on the 
principle of in de pen dence. Private claims should not be regarded as an ap-
pendix to public enforcement, but as a remedy of equal value. 0 is view is 
shared by the Eu ro pe an legislator who has underlined the “essential part” of 
national courts in applying the EU competition rules.38
3.2.2. Legal Authority of Administrative Decisions
On the other hand, the evidentiary challenge for the claimant could be 
reduced by formally binding civil courts to the / ndings of competition au-
thorities if there already has been public enforcement. Otherwise the plainti+  
would run the risk that the civil court comes to another result than the com-
petition authority. In EU law, e.g., national courts and competition authori-
ties are bound by decisions of the Eu ro pe an Commission which already have 
in Weber/Heinemann/Vogt (eds.), Methodische und konzeptionelle Grundlagen des Sch-
weizer Kartellrechts im europäischen Kontext, Bern 2009, 46 f.
38.  Recital 7 in Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003.
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been adopted or will probably be taken in the future (Art. 16 of Regulation 
1/2003).
Only in some countries are the civil courts formally bound by rulings of 
the antitrust authority (as it is the case in Greece, Hungary and Germany), 
although in fact the civil courts normally do not deviate from the / ndings of 
the antitrust authorities. German legislation goes one step further by binding 
German courts even to respect the / ndings of the competition authorities of 
other Member States.39
3.2.3. Coordination of Public and Private Enforcement
Other mea sures are necessary to coordinate public and private enforce-
ment. In many countries, civil courts have to inform competition authorities 
on pending cases. As far as Eu ro pe an competition law is concerned, Art. 15 
(3) Regulation 1/2003 gives competition authorities of the Member States the 
right to submit amicus curiae briefs to the courts. In many countries, compe-
tition authorities have this right also as far as national competition law is 
concerned. 0 us, competition authorities can contribute their perspective to 
private proceedings albeit their statements are not binding.40
On the other hand, the existence of a private law pro cess does not exclude 
the initiation of administrative proceedings. In most countries, civil courts 
have the right, but not the obligation to stay proceedings until the competi-
tion authority has taken a decision. As far as the violation of EU competition 
law is concerned, Art. 16 (1) s. 3 Regulation 1/2003 cautiously states that “the 
national court may assess whether it is necessary to stay its proceedings”. It 
seems hardly imaginable though, that a national court does not stay proceed-
ings if it gains knowledge about a relevant Commission procedure.
39.  § 33 (4) s. 1 GWB: “Where damages are claimed for an infringement of a provi-
sion of this Act or of Article 81 or 82 of the EC Treaty, the court shall be bound by a 
/ nding that an infringement has occurred, to the extent such a / nding was made in a 
/ nal decision by the cartel authority, the Commission of the Eu ro pe an Community, or 
the competition authority— or court acting as such— in another Member State of the 
Eu ro pe an Community”.
40.  Competition authorities have further possibilities to enhance private enforcement, 
see A. Heinemann, 0 e Rise of a Private Competition Law Culture, in Basedow/Ter-
hechte/TichÝ (eds.), Private Enforcement of Competition Law, Baden- Baden 2011, 224 f. 
For example, the Eu ro pe an Commission itself has brought a law suit before a Belgian 
civil court in order to ask for damages in a case where the EU has become the victim of a 
cartel; see the references in Advocate General Cruz Villalón, Opinion in case C-199/11—
Otis and others, 26.6.2012.
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3.3. Leniency Policy
Tensions may arise between proceedings for the imposition of administra-
tive / nes and private actions for damages. Many competition authorities op-
erate leniency programmes providing for the reduction of / nes or complete 
immunity from / nes for “whistle blowers”, i.e. for undertakings cooperat-
ing with the authorities by submitting information and evidence for the 
existence of prohibited practices.41 0 e goal is to unsettle cartels: the earlier 
evidence is produced the greater the advantages are. Hence there are incen-
tives to report prohibited practices as soon as possible to the competition 
authority.
0 ese incentives would vanish if the whistle blower ran the risk of being 
sued for damages by means of the information he previously revealed to the 
authorities (and which possibly triggered an administrative decision binding 
civil courts). Consequently, the question has to be asked how this contradic-
tion can be resolved or at least attenuated. 0 e problem can be tackled in tort 
law or in administrative law.
3.3.1. Reduction of Damages in Favour of Leniency Applicants?
In the Green Paper on Damages Actions, the Eu ro pe an Commission had 
put up for discussion the proposal to provide for a rebate on any damages 
claim against the leniency applicant and to liberate him from joint liability.42 
0 e Commission gave two arguments: Without the whistle blower the in-
jured parties would not have known the existence of the prohibited practice, 
or would at least have gained knowledge only later. Besides, due to the revela-
tion, other infringers can be identi/ ed who are liable without restriction. In 
the White Paper, the Commission did not hold on to the reduction of dam-
ages, but “puts forward for further consideration” the idea to limit liability to 
claims by the whistle- blower’s direct and indirect contractual partners.43
0 is proposal is very doubtful. Pragmatic re) ections typical for administra-
tive proceedings and for the / xing of / nes are transferred into private law. It 
does not seem consistent with the compensatory goal of tort law to reduce a 
damage claim because the perpetrator has cooperated with a public authority.44
41.  On the Eu ro pe an level see Commission Notice on Immunity from / nes and re-
duction of / nes in cartel cases, OJ 2006, C 298/17.
42.  Green Paper, supra note 5, 10 Option 29 and 30, in conjunction with the Annex to 
the Green Paper, n. 235 f.
43.  White Paper, supra note 5, 10.
44.  In this sense Eu ro pe an Commission, Leniency Notice, supra note 41, n. 39, s. 2: 
“0 e fact that immunity or reduction in respect of / nes is granted cannot protect an 
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3.3.2. Protection of Con# dentiality
Tensions between administrative and private law should be resolved on 
the administrative level, i.e. by appropriate rules on leniency policy. 0 e 
Eu ro pe an Commission has adopted such rules in the Leniency Notice 2006 
providing for the con/ dentiality of corporate statements. 0 e leniency appli-
cant may request that his statement is given orally, and is recorded and tran-
scribed by the Commission. Only the infringer gets access to the statement. 
0 e information may only be used for the purposes of the administrative 
proceeding pending against him.45 0 e information is transmitted to the 
national competition authorities only if these guarantee the same protec-
tion.46 As regards leniency programs on the national level in the EU Member 
States, the ECJ has highlighted the con) ict between, on the one hand, the 
interest in e+ ective leniency programs “as useful tools [ . . .  ] to uncover and 
bring to an end infringements of competition rules”, and, on the other hand, 
the contribution of damages actions “to the maintenance of e+ ective compe-
tition in the Eu ro pe an  Union”.47 0 e court has not anticipated the result of 
this weighing exercise. It is up to the national courts to weigh the respective 
interests taking into account all relevant factors of the single case.48 On this 
basis, the German courts have held that the con/ dentiality of corporate state-
ments has to be safeguarded, and that the information is therefore not avail-
able for damages actions.49
3.3.3. Remaining Tensions
However, these rules cannot prevent that the administrative proceeding 
will possibly be closed by a decision of the competition authority which may 
be introduced into a private damage claim against the leniency applicant. 
0 is shows that leniency policy is the most prominent example for frictions 
between public and private enforcement which cannot be avoided com-
pletely. 0 e deeper reason is the utilitarian approach of leniency programmes: 
 undertaking from the civil law consequences of its participation in an infringement of 
Article 81 EC”.
45.  In accordance with the Commission Notice on the rules for access to the Com-
mission / le, OJ 2005 C 325/7.
46.  Eu ro pe an Commission, Leniency Notice, supra note 41, n. 31 f.
47.  ECJ, P) eiderer, supra note 3, n. 25, 29.
48.  Ibid., n. 31.
49.  Oberlandesgericht (Higher Regional Court) Düsseldorf, 22.8.2012, case V-4 Kart 
5+6/11 (OWi).
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Sanctions are remitted or reduced although later cooperation cannot undo 
infringements committed in the past.
4. Outlook
In summary it may be said that in Eu rope the administrative law enforce-
ment of competition law is of prime importance, whereas private enforce-
ment has to catch up. Due to the absence of su  cient incentives there is a 
lack of case law. As a result, many legal questions are open: Should the in-
fringer be able to invoke the fact that the injured party passed the damage 
on to the downstream market? Should indirect victims be compensated? 
Should consumer protection associations be given standing? Should it be 
possible to calculate damages on the basis of the violator’s pro/ t? Should 
punitive damages be introduced into Eu ro pe an tort structures? Should there 
be an alleviation of burden of proof in case of complex causal connection of 
economic factors? 0 e risk of private actions is increased by these legal un-
certainties.
On the other hand, private enforcement might increase— and, in fact, has 
already increased in some countries— under the impression of particularly 
ruthless cartels. E.g., the international vitamin cartel has triggered a large 
number of private actions in di+ erent jurisdictions.50 Private competition law 
litigation could be considerably strengthened by the experiences gained in 
these procedures. Based on the relatively dense discussion in legal doctrine, 
some national legislators already have adopted stricter rules. 0 e Eu ro pe an 
legislator should be open to the ideas presented by the Eu ro pe an Commission 
in the White Paper on damages actions. But even with clearer legal rules it will 
take a long way to ensure systematic compensation of cartel victims.
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